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Summary
The privatisation policy pursued in the UK by Mrs Thatcher's government (1979-1990)
and subsequently by Mr Major's government (1990-1997) was the largest experiment in
public divestitures among capitalist economies. It had a deep impact on economic
policy-making world wide, and was vastly imitated, in Western Europe, in the former
planned economies, in a number of less developed countries. In this paper we test the
impact of privatisation on macroeconomic performance in the United Kingdom using
quarterly data from 1979 to 1999. In the econometric model, we use privatisation
proceeds as an explanatory variable and we control for several other variables. Testing
for cointegration the results show that there is a long run equilibrium relationship
between GDP growth and the variables used in the model. However, in our empirical
analysis we find a weak evidence that privatisation generated an aggregate shock on
output in the UK. This result is consistent with empirical literature on microeconomic
evidence that shows that in the UK ownership change per se had little impact on long
term productivity trends.
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1. Introduction
The broad question we would like to discuss in this work is whether British privatisation
may be considered a major policy shock in the context of the country macroeconomic performance
in the long term. There are three reasons for this inquiry.
First, the British economy changed considerably in the around twenty years we consider
since 1979. Therefore, it is interesting to see denationalization in a wider perspective, as a part of a
policy package that generated or reacted to macroeconomic signals.
Second, microeconomic analysis, i.e. cost-benefit analysis for individual agents may fail to
capture indirect effects and externalities or net benefits and costs to third parties. In principle, a set
of shadow prices offers all what we need for a general equilibrium evaluation. In practice, however,
we must often rely on proxies and on partial equilibrium assumptions. Looking for aggregate
impacts may be a way to check whether there are major spillovers.
Third, as Florio (2002) argues, in principle we can evaluate a large-scale policy reform by a
macroeconomic welfare function, including as arguments output, prices, income distribution,
unemployment, and a set of welfare weights as parameters. Therefore, it is helpful to look at
changes in these variables.
We perform a simple test focusing on real GDP and its determinants as controls for the role
of privatisation in the UK. The quarterly data used spans the period 1979-1999. The model has been
estimated in line with the cointegration technique. The time series involved are not stationary and
that renders traditional statistical tests invalid, but according to Engle and Granger (1987) if the
linear combination of the series is stationary then these series are cointegrated and there exists an
error correction representation (ECM) that incorporates short run dynamic adjustment. Moreover,
the cointegrating regression represents the long term equilibrium relationship among the variables
in the model and if the variables are cointegrated the least squares estimators of the parameters are
consistent.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that there is weak evidence of an aggregate
shock on output generated by the ownership change. The variation in GDP attributable to
privatisation seems very close to zero. The result is consistent with microeconomic evidence
discussed in Florio (2002).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some conceptual
issues that my be relevant for the discussion. Section 3 illustrates some of the macroeconomic2
trends in the UK before and after privatisation. Section 4 describes the specification of the model
and presents the results. Concluding remarks are reported in section 5.
2. Analytical framework
To evaluate the impact of privatisation on macroeconomic trends in Britain, this section
presents some topics that may be relevant for the discussion.
In the short run, following divestiture, we may observe mainly demand effects, and an IS-LM
framework may be appropriate, in spite of its well-known limitations. In the medium term, we need
to consider supply-side effects. Productivity, costs, and prices may change, and we turn to an AS-
AD framework. Lastly, in the long run, we should look to sustainable output growth, and we would
need a growth model. A full specification of these three frameworks for the British economy would
be a daunting task that goes far beyond our research scope. We simply suggest a mental experiment.
To begin, and to simplify, suppose we are in a closed economy. In the short term, output
matches demand of consumption goods, of investment goods, and of public expenditures. Broad
money supply matches money demand, which in turn depends upon output, prices, and interest rate.
Prices are fixed. When we move to a dynamic setting and we consider a sufficient time span, we
need to explain price changes. In the familiar AS-AD context, the supply side of the economy
results from consistent wage setting in the labour market and price setting by firms. The former
depends upon expected prices and costs, current unemployment rate relative to its structural rate,
and labour protection by legislation or unionisation. In the longer run, we should look at sustainable
economic growth and its proximate factors, labour force, capital, and knowledge (or other suitable
definitions of innovation drivers).
Privatisation may potentially have an impact on several macroeconomic variables, in the
short run as in the long run, particularly on output, employment, investment, and TFP, hence on
costs and prices. We present here, informally, just some examples, with the proviso that several
other cases are possible. Privatisation, which we consider here as a one-time sale of assets, amounts
initially to changing the ownership shares in the existing stock of domestic assets.
On the demand side, a crucial variable is the differential between the present value of
income of a public and a privately owned enterprise, ‘the public-private valuation differential’ (see
MacKenzie, 1998 and Florio, 2002). The value may be negative, positive or zero.  This sets three
possible cases: indifference pricing, overpricing, and underpricing.
With underpricing (overpricing), government sells its assets as equity capital at a price less
(more) than the expected net present value of the future stream of income under public ownership3
regime, discounted by the discount rate of uncommitted public funds. At the same time, the sale
price is less than the private valuation of the assets (otherwise, private agents will not buy).
Indifference pricing occurs when the sale price is exactly equal to the net present value of assets
to the owner, and there is coincidence with value to the buyer.
A second variable is the method of financing the acquisition by the private sector. There are
the following illustrative financing cases, each of them compatible with the above valuation cases:
a)  bond/equity swap: buyers acquire equities by selling government bonds they own (we exclude
here sale of corporate bonds)
b)  equity/equity swap: investors sell other equities and buy privatisation shares
c)  money/equity swap: reduction of money balances (we exclude  here financing acquisitions by
loans) finances the acquisitions.
Lastly, a third variable is the way in which the government uses the privatisation proceeds
(for example for reducing the public debt, re-investment or financing current expenditure).
Government may buy back bonds and reduce its net debt, or it can use the proceeds to pay for
new public investment goods or to finance current expenditure, or it can reduce taxation, without
changing its fiscal stance.
If there are several privatisation initial share offerings, there may be cases where
government selects a combination for one divestiture decision and another one for another, so that
we observe a combination of cases. However, we disregard this possibility, and focus here on a
“one shot” large scale divestiture decision. Moreover, government may accompany divestiture with
lax or binding price regulation (or liberalisation).
Because we have three variables and three possibilities for each of them, and two regulatory
regimes, there are then 27x2=54 combinations, probably with different macroeconomic impacts.
For example, we can observe indifference pricing cum equity/equity swap cum public investment
increase and tough regulation; or overpricing cum money/equity swap cum tax decrease and lax
regulation.
We focus here on just two illustrative combinations: privatisation with underpricing, public
debt redemption, and with and without lax regulation or competition.
Government sells its assets as equity capital at a price less than the expected net present
value of the future stream of income and less than the private valuation. Privatisation proceeds are
committed to buy back bonds. Savers finance their acquisition of new equities by selling
government bonds
This case has several macroeconomic consequences. In the short run, private wealth
increases, because while the savers have to sell bonds up to a value of the sale price, they receive a4
windfall capital gain
1 and that may give a push to demand. Because in the short run government
taxes are unaffected, while public investment falls, fiscal policy is restrictive. However, the increase
of private consumption and investment may counteract this negative impact. The IS curve shifts
upwards, while the LM curve is unaffected. We may observe an initial demand shock, proportional
to divestiture value and to the extent of underpricing.
In the medium term, the picture changes. First, if the private discount rate is greater than the
social discount rate, as it often may be true, indifference pricing or underpricing imply that the
stream of real income generated by privatised companies is higher than by the nationalised
companies. This is because the valuation is inversely related to the discount rate.  There are two
different scenarios.
Private owners may expect higher productivity. This in turn, if the mark up is constant (or
decreasing because privatisation is compounded with greater competition or strict price regulation)
implies a decrease in output prices. For a large-scale privatisation (in the UK output of privatised
corporations was around 10 percent of GDP, in transition economies a higher share), this reduces
the general price index. Hence, real money increases and the LM curve shifts downwards.
Aggregate demand shifts, and we have a new equilibrium with an increase of output, and a decrease
of interest rate. Cost decrease implies that the AS curve shifts downwards and this allows higher
output with price decrease. This sequence confirms the initial impact on demand. Employment may
temporary decrease, but higher output may counteract this initial impact.
Alternatively, with lax regulation and weak competition, we may observe a different story.
Profit expectation after privatisation may by based on an outlook for higher relative prices. Private
investors forecast undemanding price regulation and unconstrained market power. In the AS-AD
framework, the result of a higher mark-up over costs may be inferior output equilibrium. Thus,
while privatisation has limited impact on the IS curve because both public and private wealth are
unaffected, it may have opposite impact on output in the longer term, following changes in relative
prices.
Thus, we may have two new possible equilibria, one clearly expansionary, the other one
recessive. These depend upon the origin of profit expectation, higher productivity or higher mark-
up. In the “higher productivity” scenario, we have both favorable demand and supply effects. In the
“higher mark-up scenario” the demand positive impact is counteracted by an adverse supply shock.
There is a range of combinations between the two scenarios and some caveats.
First, government lost net wealth, or the net present value of future incomes, less
privatisation proceeds. In the long run, if it wants to restore its net wealth it needs either to raise tax,
                                                          
1 Florio (2002) shows that in the UK this may have been around 20 percent in 24 hours.5
perhaps in the form of capital gains taxation (as with the Labour “windfall tax”) or to reduce current
expenditures. This policy may counteract the expansionary impact of underpricing policy (even if
households do not thrust the Barro-Ricardo equivalence).
Second, there may be a negative impact on private investment because underpricing is in
fact a subsidy to buyers of already existing assets. This subsidy increases the return to equity of
owners of privatised companies as compared with the owners of other companies, and may in the
long run displace investment in other sectors.
Third, cost savings may counteract increased mark-ups.
Summing-up: in the short run, with underpricing, the impact is expansionary, government
net worth is diminished, private net worth increased, and privatisation is not very different from a
public transfer financed by debt. In the longer run, the increase of output could be further sustained
by strict regulation or increased competition, but it could also be reversed by an increase of
company mark-up. Government may limit the demand effects if it taxes away the capital gains that
accrued to buyers or raises other taxes in future in order to recoup the wealth it has lost.
Incidentally, we may note that with underpricing and higher mark-up there is a regressive
redistribution of wealth from the taxpayers and consumers in favor of the shareholders. This may
bring down consumption and output in the long term (particularly if some of the shareholders are
foreign investors).
An alternative or complementary path to bring down the AS curve, is to force down wages,
perhaps through a decrease of labour protection (e.g. limiting the power of unions and the scope of
labor legislation). This may have been important in the British experience.
Lastly, in an open economy with a regime of flexible exchange rates, a wide privatisation
program may attract capital from abroad and thus we may observe appreciation of the local
currency. However, if there are inflationary effects associated with divestiture, the opposite may
happen. The sign of exchange rate change sign is therefore ambiguous.
All this looks rather complex, but in a sense, it amounts to restate the obvious. In the short
term, privatisation may have mainly demand effects, and in medium term supply effects. This may
change equilibrium output. There will be output increase if there is underpricing (without
expectations of subsequent capital gain taxation), plus productivity increase, and no mark up
increase.
Without an initial productivity shock, the impact of public divestitures on output will
probably be negligible or negative.
In fact, the privatisation productivity jump may not materialise because of slack regulation,
weak competition, and because the effect of ownership change per se is small.6
In the long run, we need a permanent change in productivity performance to sustain a new
growth pattern.
We discuss briefly this point. As Schipke (2001,p.11) points out:
“The extent to which a reduction in government activity has implications for output growth depends
on whether and to what degree privatization affects the national savings rate, the level of capital
investment (both physical and human), the efficiency with which the resources are used, and the
rate of technological progress. Furthermore, whether the divestment of public enterprises has a one-
time or transitory impact or instead affects economic growth permanently depends on which models
captures growth process most adequately”.
According to endogenous growth theory, higher savings and investment, because of
decrease of public deficit, may sustain a long term increase of the growth rate. Therefore, if
privatisation contributes to better financial conditions in the public sector and to faster adoption of
new technologies in the private sector, we should be able to discern not just output increase, but
also output growth increase in the long run. The economy will change its development trajectory.
However, the “if” conditions are very important here, as our previous examples show.
3. Macroeconomic trends in the UK
The following is an illustration of the time profile of some macro variables to analyse the
evolution of the macroeconomic trends in the UK during the period of privatisation.
a)  in order to test the macroeconomic impact of privatisation we need an explanatory
variable representative of divestitures. The most obvious candidate is the time series of privatisation
proceeds, for which we have collected quarterly data, at constant 1995 prices, since 1979. Fig. 3.1
shows the privatisation proceeds as percentage of GDP. We added to net proceeds for sales of
public corporation also the proceeds for the sales of council houses.7
Fig. 3.1    Privatisation proceeds as percentage of GDP (quarterly data)
Source: our elaboration on ONS data.
Since, as presented in Fig. 3.1, the privatisation proceeds in some period are 2% or more of
GDP, we could expect a significant impact of the privatisation programme on the macroeconomic
performance in the UK. For example, Wallis (1987) and Florio (1990) review simulations of
macroeconomic impacts of seven econometric models of the UK economy in the 1980s and find:
-  3.25% increase of public expenditures financed by high-powered money increase GDP
by 0.6-0.9% for most models.
-  5% decrease of marginal rate of income tax (eg. from 30% to 28.5%) has a typical
impact around 0.2% of GDP.
-  10% decrease of VAT rate (from 15% to 13.6%) has an impact around 0.2% on GDP.
All these examples have a dimension similar or inferior to the yearly flow of privatisation
proceeds on most years. Thus we may be confident that the privatisation proceeding variable is not
negligible in public finance terms.
b) The years between 1950-1979 were a period of relative decline for UK. Around 1950, the
UK was third in the world, after the US and Switzerland, in terms of real per capita GDP (in PPP
dollars, 1990, based on Maddison data). In 1979, UK was only 11
th, after Belgium and Austria,
while France and West Germany were now third and fourth in the ranking. Between 1979-1996
there was a further small drop, and UK ranked 12
th. According to Craft (1998), the Conservative
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However, this achievement does not seem impressive. Ranking is not a very good
performance. It seems better to compare levels. At the end of the 1970s, the per capita GDP of the
UK was still 10 percent higher than the average for OECD countries. In 1996, it was 8 percent
lower. The OECD (1998) survey
2 shows that the gap between the UK and the US between 1960 and
1996 was virtually unchanged (in fact, on average the gap was smaller in the first 20 years than
after 1979).
  Probably, the best comparison is with EU countries. If we take the British per capita income
in 1960 to be 100, the other countries in the European Union recorded a level of 80 in 1960. These
countries were recording over 100 in 1980 and, after some distancing in the following years, had
overtaken the UK again in the 1990s.
To understand relative changes in income per person, we should consider GDP growth in
different countries. Craft observes that it was 2.3 percent yearly for the UK 1950-1979, and 1,7 per
cent in 1979-1996. He comments: “This took place in the context of a widespread retardation in
growth in which British growth did not accelerate but slowed a lot less than most (other countries).”
This may be true, but it is not an indication of good performance. Real GDP yearly growth in the
UK 1960-1973, before the first oil shock, was more than 3 per cent, and only 1,4 percent in 1973-
1979. It is fair to say that after those troubled years, the British economy simply converged to the
low growth of most other developed countries.
After an initial slowdown probably because of monetarist policies in the 1980s, the annual
rate of growth of GDP in the UK in the last decade of Conservative years, was around 2.5 per cent.
This growth rate for the UK was probably close to its average for the last 50 years
(Maddison,2001).
It is true that in 1950-1979, the British growth rate was only two thirds of the average of
OECD countries. However, that average included excellent performances in some countries, as the
growth rates of Japan (6,8 per cent), West Germany or Italy (both around 4,5 per cent). In the
following twenty years, growth in the UK was still marginally below the OECD average.  This does
not look as a British growth miracle. It is the coming back of the old pattern, after the slump in the
1970s. At the same time, it reflects the fading of the true miracle in other countries.
This view is reinforced when we look at productivity trends.
According to OECD (1998), privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation of the labour
market in the UK had a substantial impact on productivity.
                                                          
2 OECD (1998, fig. 11, p.55)9
“The wide-reaching programme of structural reform over the past couple of decades has
probably helped UK productivity levels to catch-up with best practices although a substantial gap
remains” (OECD, 1998, p. 54).
In fact, productivity per employee and per hour worked increased between 1985 and 1996 in
the UK at a higher rate than that of other G7 countries, enabling the country to reduce the gap from
the US. If we take 100 to be the value added per hour worked (or per worker) in the manufacturing
sector in the US, in the UK it was 45.0 in 1960; 53.6 in 1973; 59.7 in 1985; and 69.7 in 1995.
Other authors suggest that the productivity growth in the 1980s in the UK was genuine and
largely due to reduction of union power
3, but masked by poor macroeconomic management and
adverse demand side conditions. Again, this may be true, but labour productivity can increase for
two different reasons. Sustained output growth can exceed employment growth. Alternatively, the
denominator drives the process, and stable or modestly increasing output faces sharply decreasing
employment. As we shall see below, in the UK there was wide de-industrialisation and
unemployment tripled in few years. Hence, labour productivity growth exceeded output per capita
growth.
Obviously, demand has an important role in productivity trends. In fact, the relative gain in
productivity was 16 per cent in the last ten years of the period considered, during which the policies
of the Conservative governments were fully unfurled. However, it was 19% in the 13 years before
the first oil shock, years in which the political situation was quite different, with powerful trade
unions and a large nationalised sector. In the intervening period, between 1973 and 1985, the
relative increase in productivity was 11%.
International comparisons offer mixed evidence that the Conservative years mark an
aggregate productivity jump.
Moreover, when we consider separately the manufacturing sector and the marketed services,
the story is different. In the former, the monetary squeeze and recession in the early 1980s provoked
substantial labour shedding and then raised capital per employee. Labour productivity growth in
manufacturing increased substantially, while there was no change or decrease in the service sector
that includes most of the privatised industries.
c) we turn now to our controls, starting with investments. In the 1990s
4, public investments
in the UK declined at an average annual rate of 0.8%, with a cumulative effect of falling from a
modest 1.3% in 1988 to 0.98% in 1997, perhaps the lowest level of all OECD countries. This
                                                          
3 Oulton, 1995; Brown et al, 1997
4 Cf. OECD Tab. A, p.17610
phenomenon is only to be expected if a large scale privatization policy is not offset by using the
proceeds from divestments for infrastructure investments but rather for public debt redemption or
financing current expenditure
5.
We can ask ourselves whether private investment substituted public investment to a
corresponding or higher degree. The rate of growth of private investments over the period averaged
2.5% (2.9% of residential construction). However, despite this rate of growth, the gross non-
residential investment in the UK, as a share of GDP, is the lowest in the European Union.
The OECD (1998) Survey on UK states that:
“Low investment, especially by companies (…) manufacturing and public sector (…) has become,
in conjunction with sluggish labour supply, a barrier to sustained expansion” (p. 18).
On the arrival of the Thatcher government in the UK the ratio of investment to GDP was in
the region of 18%, in 1997 it had then fallen to below 16% (with a peak of over 20% in 1989)
6.
d) The 1980s in the United Kingdom witnessed a decisive attack by the Government on
elements of rigidity in the labour market. Senior Conservative politicians considered privatisation
also, if not mainly, as a move with which to weaken the trade unions.
“Since the early 1980s, the United Kingdom’s labour market has been radically transformed.
A series of employment laws reduced employees', and especially unions', bargaining power. Wage
councils - which set occupational minimum wages and work conditions - were largely abolished,
welfare benefits reduced in relative terms and eligibility tightened. These reforms helped reduce
structural unemployment but had little discernible effect on raising employment rates. Despite a
highly deregulated and more flexible labour market, the aggregate participation rate has not
increased over the past couple of decades, averaging 75%, considerably lower than the United
States and Scandinavian countries” (OECD, 1998).
One could note here that the participation rate in the UK is much higher than in a number of
countries in continental Europe.
Moreover, of the 7.5 million individuals of working age but economically inactive, a large
quota is made up of people either taking early retirement or defined as disabled.
The second group, especially, recorded a spectacular increase. Over the twenty years the absolute
increase was 1.5 million people, or 4% of the population. As a result, while unemployment fell, also
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6 The OECD data on the other hand are not in full agreement with the picture that emerges from HM Treasury (1999, p.
131) which, at 1995 prices, shows growth in the ratio of non-residential investments to GDP between 1982 and 1989,
then drop off until 1994 and subsequently a noticeable recovery.11
because of the increased participation of women, there was an increase in the number of people
with a history of work who were excluded from the labour force, especially adult males.
On average, between 1988 and 1997 the unemployment rate in the UK was 8.1% and at the
end of the period it was 7.1%. This is a quite a low figure if compared to the situation in a number
of other countries in continental Europe. However, if a large part of the increase in the number of
disabled and early-retired is disguised unemployment, then involuntary unemployment in United
Kingdom was over 10%, no better than that of other European countries.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that a part of the involuntary unemployment disguised as
invalidity or early-retirement can be traced back to the large scale downsizing of privatised firms.
e) Looking at the budget balance of the public sector there is evidence of a deterioration in
the 1970s, followed by a policy of fiscal contraction in the 1980s, which coincides with the three
mandates of Mrs. Thatcher, and then a worsening in the 1990s under the government of John Major,
and lastly a net improvement in recent years of our time horizon.
The ratio of public debt to GDP contracted in the 1970s, falling by a good 20 points,
remained stable in the first half of the 1980s, decreased in the second half of the decade by almost
another 20, and then worsened again (an increase of roughly 10 points).
The net worth of the public sector (which includes both financial liabilities and real assets)
deteriorated considerably, from a maximum of 82% of GDP in 1979 to a minimum of 13.7% of
GDP in 1998.
Between 1979 and 1997 the ratio between taxation and GDP increased by 2 points; over the
same period total public spending fell from 43% to 39%; the average reduction, if we compare the
seventies, eighties and nineties, does not appear to be an impressive one for a government strongly
committed to “rolling back the state”.
Moreover, a large part of the cuts in spending was due to the decline in public investments.
f) Inflationary process in the UK is a long-term phenomenon, which, despite the monetarist
policies of the first phase of Conservative governments, has been a constant feature over the past
twenty years. HM Treasury (1999, p. 10) summarises it as follows:
“...for most of the past 30 years, the UK's inflation record has been poor. During the 1970's,
inflation averaged 13 per cent, peaking at almost 27 per cent in August 1975. Inflation averaged 7
per cent during the 1980s and reached over 9 per cent in the early 1990s. From 1980 to 1997 the12
UK had the second highest average inflation rate of the G7 countries, and it had greater variability
in inflation than all countries but France and Italy”.
In this context, we can ask ourselves whether the sectors that were first nationalised and then
privatised contributed to containing inflation, if they were neutral or if, on the contrary, they
amplified it.
When we control for demand and input prices, the privatised sectors did not experienced
output price trends that were terribly different from the long run performance of the nationalised
industries. Furthermore, while some of these sectors may have recorded some reductions in prices
in real terms, for example telecommunications, others recorded increases, for example water, buses,
and railways.
To sum up our findings are the following.
First, public sector investment in the UK fell quite drastically over the period considered for
two distinct reasons:
a) because as state owned enterprises gradually disappear, so do their investments;
b) because of the adoption of restrictive budgetary measures.
Private investment did not substitute falling public investment. Although, after a long period
of stagnation private investments picked up at the end of the 1990s, coinciding with the favorable
cycle in the whole OECD area, the investment ratio in the UK was low in comparison with EU
countries. This hindered output growth.
Second, despite the liberalisation of the labour market and the transfer of a large number of
workers from the traditionally very unionised public sector to the private one, the participation rate
did not increase. Involuntary unemployment, bearing in mind disguised forms of unemployment
due to early retirement or invalidity, did not decrease and was no lower than that of many EU
countries.
Third, long term inflation in the UK was no lower, and often higher than that of other
European countries. The prices of the services of some privatised utilities dropped, but others
increased. Even conceding that the average price index of privatised firms was falling in
comparison with RPI index, overall the productivity change in the service sector was modest and
real price decrease was lower than its potential
7.
                                                          
7 The inflationary impact of cuts in capital account public spending was studied by Buiter (1987), in a different context.
He shows, applying a model of a small open economy, that public investments cuts four separate effects:
a)  A direct effect on spending, which presumes a reduction of the budget deficit of exactly the same size as the
investment cut;
b)  A direct effect on budget revenues, equal to the variation in cash flows from the management of public capital;13
  Moreover, one specific channel of transmission suggested by the UK experience is the
formation of an unexpected capital gain by households because of underpricing of privatisation
shares and council houses. To accommodate this ‘shock’ of unexpected enrichment, the families’
marginal propensity to saving should rise, if only provisionally. What actually happened was that
during the period considered the rate of saving of families plummeted and there were occasional
booms in consumption and real estate investments.
In the first phase of the British privatisation policy, under-pricing, public investment cuts
and tax reforms, faced with rigidity of supply, because of the prolonged stagnation of private and
public investments, contributed to inflationary trends and to large deficits in the trade balance.
Fourth, there is no clear evidence that positive shocks on the supply side did anything to
divert economic growth in the UK from its long-term trend. It is also difficult to identify any effect
on the level of GDP and on productivity changes in the long-run. The “miracle” apparently was just
the end of decades of relative decline in comparison to other countries. However, this was more the
effect of the fading of exceptionally high growth elsewhere than of a good performance of the
British economy.
Having said this, apparently we have a conceptual case for a shock while prima facie no
clear evidence  of it: thus, we want to test our time series to discover if data may support the view
that after controlling for other variables, privatization in fact had a potential beneficial effect on
output.
4. Methodology and results
In specifying our model we take into account the results shown in Barnett (2000). The
author, using a panel of 18 countries, analyses the relationship between privatisation programme
and macroeconomic performance and he finds that increased privatisation is associated with
improvement in real GDP growth. In the regressions, Barnett includes both contemporaneous and
lagged proceeds coming from privatisation and the only control variables used is the lagged GDP
growth.
8 In our work we try to replicate the same framework using UK data, but our results seem
                                                                                                                                                                                                
c)  An indirect effect on tax revenue, as a consequence of the influence of lower investments on aggregate demand
and thus on fiscal receipts;
d)  Lastly an effect on the demand for money which, given a certain rate of real interest and of inflation, operates
through the income (or wealth) of the agents.
Whilst it is clear, also intuitively, that ceteris paribus effect a) is deflationary and that effect  b) is ambiguous, the last
two effects are unambiguously inflationary. It is therefore possible that the two groups of effects balance each other out.
8 In order to determine the permanent effects of privatisation on GDP growth, the author estimates equations of the
following form:  yit=µi + αyi,t-1 + δpit + uit  where yit is the GDP growth, pit are privatisation proceeds expressed as a
share of GDP and uit are the residuals.14
not to be robust and quite different suggesting that such a model is likely not to be suitable for UK
analyses.
9
In the paper we develop a different model to perform a simple test of the long run impact of
privatisation on output in the UK. Our test focuses on real GDP and its determinants as controls for
the role of privatisation.
We test a loglinear regression equation of the form:
yt = µ + βPrivt + γzt + εt (1)
where: yt is real GDP, Privt are privatization  proceeds, zt is a vector of explanatory variables  and εt
is an error term. Our variable of interest is Priv, therefore a positive and significant  estimate  of the
parameter β would suggest a positive long-run elasticity between  privatization  and output for the
UK economy.
Based on the previous discussion, and data availability, the variables we have selected as
controls include, for different specifications: government expenditures, taxes, investment , export,
import, broad money supply, inflation, interest rates, unemployment, the working days lost because
of industrial actions, price of shares and surplus per employee. In other words, it is hypothesised
that the real GDP is affected by several demand and supply related variables and, in order to
identify the role of privatisation on GDP, a measure of privatisation proceeds is added. We use
quarterly data and the period covered is 1979-1999. We transform nominal values in 1995 constant
pounds by the appropriate GDP deflators
10.
The empirical regression equation (1) is in loglinear form, causing the coefficient of the
variables to be elasticity and reducing heteroscedasticity.
One of the main issues related to the estimation of time series data, concerns the stationarity
of the variables involved. In fact, statistical inference about the parameter may be problematic if the
level representation of real GDP contains non stationary variables. Therefore, stationarity tests are
conducted for the several concerned variables used in the model. Performing a Dickey and Fuller's
(1979) ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) test and Phillips and Perron's (PP) (1988) test, we find that
the variables involved are integrated of the same order: I(1). Figure A.1, reported in the Appendix,
presents the trend of each variables used in the model.
                                                          
9 Our regressions are not reported in the paper, and are available with the authors on request.
10 See Appendix for data sources and details of variable construction.15
A second issue that is closely related to the first is whether the concerned variables are
cointegrated. This is important, because if there exists cointegration, it can be concluded that there
is a long-run equilibrium relationship between these variables even if they are nonstationary.
Moreover, if there is cointegration the regressions  (1) , called the "cointegrating regression", is
attempted to fit the long run equilibrium relationship without worrying about the dynamics and the
least square estimators of the parameters are consistent.
The test for cointegration proceeds is in two steps following Engle and Granger (1987)
procedure. First, after testing the integration of the individual series, we run the cointegrating
regression linking the several series in level, as in equation (1). Once equation (1) is estimated, the
residuals, εt , are recovered and subjected to the usual unit root test using ADF test and/or PP test. If
the residuals are stationary we can assume cointegration. A cointegrating regression is suggested to
represent the long-term equilibrium while the cointegrating error term εt-1 serves as a measure of
disequilibrium. If evidence in support of cointegration is found, we estimate an error correction
model (ECM) that incorporate the first differenced form of equation (1) and its lagged residuals, as
follows:
∆yt = µ + β∆Privt + γ∆zt + θεt-1 + ut (2)
where ut is a random error term.
It is interesting to note that estimating equation (1) in first differences (excluding the error
correction term) is inappropriate if the variables have an error correction representation; the
omission of the error correction term would entail a misspecification error and a potentially biased
elasticity coefficient if cointegration is admitted.
Further, a negative and statistically significant estimate of θ would suggest convergence of
the model to a long-run equilibrium and the coefficient θ can be interpreted as a speed of the
adjustment.
Regarding the empirical results, the estimation of equations (1) with some different
specifications are shown in Tab.4.1. The residuals generated from the cointegration equation are
tested for stationarity using ADF and PP test and the test statistics generated from the equations (1)
and (2) are presented in Tab. 4.1.16
For every different specification the tests indicate that the residuals are stationary and
therefore this suggest that there exists cointegration. Hence, there generally exists a significant
long-run relationship between the UK GDP and the several variables included in the model.
Regarding our interest in the coefficient of Priv we find that in most specifications the
coefficient β is positive and statistically significant but very close to zero, suggesting a weak impact
on the growth of the country. In some model we use the rate of interest instead of M4 as control
variables. In these cases, the coefficient β is never significant and the ADF and PP test suggest that
there exists a week co-integration among the variables involved.
From Tab. 4.1 we may analyse the long-run elasticity of the other control variables included
in the model,  and the sign of their estimated coefficient seems in line with the macroeconomic
theory.
To examine the short-term adjustment process to deviation from the long-run equilibrium
relationship the parameters of the error correction model are presented in Tab. 4.2.  The results
show that β, that indicates the short run effect of privatisation proceeds on GDP, is not statistically
significant. In Tab. 4.2  we report a standard diagnostic test (Ramsey's RESET).
In conclusion, we find a statistically significant positive parameter for privatisation
proceeds, but it is very close to zero. GDP elasticity for privatisation proceeds is around 0,003 in
our best empirical model. We obviously need to be careful in the interpretation, because we are
testing a simple reduced form equation of the UK economy and there may be several omitted
variables.
However, in other models, where we consider cumulated proceeds or where we use an HP
filter for GDP, or other explanatory variables, the parameter estimates are even lower or not
significant
11.
These coefficient estimates, taken together, suggest that - at least until 1999 - privatization
per se had a very modest macroeconomic impact on GDP in the UK. Therefore, we can exclude the
existence of major growth externalities in our time horizon, and we can turn to the microeconomic
approach.
                                                          
11 The regressions are not reported in the paper, and are available with the authors on request.17
Tab. 4.1
Estimates of the cointegration regression model Equation 1 with  log GDP as the dependent
variable.


























































































































































2 adj 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
DW 1.23 0.83 1.35 1.15 1.15 0.84 1.36 1.35
ADF -3.23 -2.66 -3.94 -2.85 -2.89 -2.65 -4.08 -4.11
PP -6.16 -4.63 -6.45 -5.83 -5.86 -4.62 -6.50 -6.70
 Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, c denotes statistical significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance. The critical values
of the ADF and PP statistics are computed by McKinnon at the 1, 5 and 10% level are -3.51, -2.89, -2.58 respectively.18
Tab. 4.2
Estimates of the error correction model Equation 2 with the first difference of log GDP as the
dependent variable.










































































































































































2 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.64 0.60
R
2 adj 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.54 0.55 0.61 0.59 0.54

























 Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b, c denotes statistical significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance.
5. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of privatisation on macroeconomic
performance in the United Kingdom.
The first issue that we have investigated regarding the impact that the different ways of
selling public assets may have on output. From this angle, if the government wants to increase
output in the long run should not focus only on privatisation but should promote other industrial
policy such as competition or price regulation.19
The second issue refers to the trend of some macroeconomic variables. The analysis
suggests there is no clear evidence of a structural break in GDP growth before and after
privatisation. Moreover, there is no evidence of productivity changes in the long run; the
partecipation rate did not increase; public investment dropped sharply; the long term inflation in the
UK was no lower than that of other European countries .
In the empirical exercise we estimate the long-run relationship between privatisation
proceeds and gross domestic product in the UK. Our main objective is to see whether privatisation
had positive effects on the macroeconomic improvement in Britain. Following the cointegration
techniques we have found a weak relationship between our variable or interest, namely privatisation
proceeds, and the GDP. This result is confirmed in most specifications we have used, both in long
run and short run equation.
We repeat, these are just conjectures that are scarcely demonstrable at this stage. However, it
appears to be equally difficult with the data that we have reported to demonstrate the opposite
position: that privatisation over the past twenty years had a positive impact on the country's growth
and welfare.
Two possible objections are worth considering. One may admit that there is no
macroeconomic evidence of a supply-side shock, but consider that this is because the impact, albeit
positive, is small and cannot be captured by aggregate variables. A related, but somewhat different
objection is that the positive impact is masked by other adverse changes (Oulton, 1995).
As for the first objection, the issue seems to be how we can say that a supply shock is
"small" relative to the economy. If we consider the privatisation proceeds/GDP its dimension is
certainly not negligible, being in some years more than 1-2 per cent of GDP. This dimension is
comparable with fiscal reforms that are usually tested by standard macro-econometric models of the
British economy as we have described in section 2.
The second possible objection is similar in spirit, but it advances the doubt that positive and
negative shocks cancel out each other. There is little doubt that monetary policy and high exchange
rates in the 1980s damaged the British economy, particularly exports. There is also little doubt that
there was an investment slowdown for most of the 1990s. Our empirical models support the view
that GDP in the UK is highly dependent on the rest of the world and on investment. According to
Oulton (1995), without the British participation in the ERM and without budgetary mismanagement
by the Exchequer in the ‘90s, we may have been able to observe the positive impact of the supply
side shocks, including industrial legislation reform, privatisation, and higher participation in
education and vocational training.  However, our empirical tests control for fiscal stance, exports,20
and investments, and we cannot confirm nothing more than a very modest impact of privatisation
per se.
The results presented are in keeping with microeconomic evidence that shows that the
impact of ownership change per se is limited (Florio, 2003) and that the drivers of productivity
changes are demand, technology, regulation and liberalisation.
In conclusion: if government wants to increase output in the long run should not focus on
privatisation, but on ways to achieve higher productivity in the concerned sector. It should have an
industrial policy to do that. This may include privatisation and an active policy to promote
competition, or privatisation and strict price regulation, or restructuring state owned enterprises in
combination with competition or with price regulation and a hard budget constraint. Which solution
is better depends upon the best way in practice to get a productivity jump.21
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Appendix
Descriptions  of the data used and their sources follow.
The data are quarterly and cover the period 1979:2-1999:1. Data are at constant 1995 prices and
seasonally adjusted; data at current prices have been deflated by the GDP deflator.
The main sources for the data is ONS except for UNEMPL data that are from OECD and FTSE100
data that are from Datastream.
Variables:
PRIV: Privatisation Proceeds. The main source of Privatisation Proceeds are ONS "Financial
statistic explanatory handbook, 2000 edition, and HM Treasury "Public expenditure: statistical
analyses"
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNET : Net Government Expenditure calculated as:  Total Current Government Expenditure less
Public Sector Taxes on Income and Wealth
INV: Gross Fixed Capital Formation
EXP: Exports Total
M4: Broad Money Stock, end of period,  level
INTEREST: Three Month Yield, Treasury Bills
INFLATION: RPI:Percentage change over 12 months - all items
UNEMPL: Unemployed percentage of  total labour force (source: OECD)
DAYLOST: Working Days Lost, yearly data. The quarterly data are calculated using
the percentage of employee in each quarters.
SURPLUS: is a measure of mark-up calculated as:  Gross Operating Surplus over Employee Jobs
FTSE100: is another measure of mark-up. FTSE 100 Price Index (Datastream)24






















































































































79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series
Our Note di Lavoro are available on the Internet at the following addresses:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.html
http://www.ssrn.com/link/feem.html
NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2003
PRIV 1.2003 Gabriella CHIESA and Giovanna NICODANO: Privatization and Financial Market Development: Theoretical
Issues
PRIV 2.2003 Ibolya SCHINDELE: Theory of Privatization in Eastern Europe: Literature Review
PRIV 3.2003 Wietze LISE, Claudia KEMFERT and Richard S.J. TOL: Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity
Market
CLIM 4.2003 Laura MARSILIANI and Thomas I. RENSTRÖM: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of
Government Commitment
KNOW 5.2003 Reyer GERLAGH: Induced Technological Change under Technological Competition
ETA 6.2003 Efrem CASTELNUOVO: Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model
SIEV 7.2003 Anna ALBERINI, Alberto LONGO, Stefania TONIN, Francesco TROMBETTA and Margherita TURVANI: The
Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment:
Evidence from Surveys of Developers
NRM 8.2003 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse?
CLIM 9.2003 A. CAPARRÓS, J.-C. PEREAU and T. TAZDAÏT: North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game
with Asymmetric Information
KNOW 10.2003 Giorgio BRUNELLO and Daniele CHECCHI: School Quality and Family Background in Italy
CLIM 11.2003 Efrem CASTELNUOVO and Marzio GALEOTTI: Learning By Doing vs Learning By Researching in a Model of
Climate Change Policy Analysis
KNOW 12.2003 Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI (eds.): Economic Growth, Innovation, Cultural
Diversity: What are we all talking about? A critical survey of the state-of-the-art
KNOW 13.2003 Carole MAIGNAN, Gianmarco OTTAVIANO, Dino PINELLI and Francesco RULLANI (lix): Bio-Ecological
Diversity vs. Socio-Economic Diversity. A Comparison of Existing Measures
KNOW 14.2003 Maddy JANSSENS and Chris STEYAERT (lix): Theories of Diversity within Organisation Studies: Debates and
Future Trajectories
KNOW 15.2003 Tuzin BAYCAN LEVENT, Enno MASUREL and Peter NIJKAMP (lix): Diversity in Entrepreneurship: Ethnic and
Female Roles in Urban Economic Life
KNOW 16.2003 Alexandra BITUSIKOVA (lix): Post-Communist City on its Way from Grey to Colourful: The Case Study from
Slovakia
KNOW 17.2003 Billy E. VAUGHN and Katarina MLEKOV (lix): A Stage Model of Developing an Inclusive Community




19.2003 Sergio CURRARINI: On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities
PRIV 20.2003 Giacomo CALZOLARI and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Monopoly with Resale
PRIV 21.2003 Claudio MEZZETTI (lx): Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation
Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
PRIV 22.2003 Marco LiCalzi and Alessandro PAVAN (lx): Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-
Price Auctions
PRIV 23.2003 David ETTINGER (lx): Bidding among Friends and Enemies
PRIV 24.2003 Hannu VARTIAINEN (lx): Auction Design without Commitment
PRIV 25.2003 Matti KELOHARJU, Kjell G. NYBORG and Kristian RYDQVIST (lx): Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in
Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions
PRIV 26.2003 Christine A. PARLOUR and Uday RAJAN (lx): Rationing in IPOs
PRIV 27.2003 Kjell G. NYBORG and Ilya A. STREBULAEV (lx): Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes
PRIV 28.2003 Anders LUNANDER and Jan-Eric NILSSON (lx): Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative
Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts
PRIV 29.2003 TangaMcDANIEL and Karsten NEUHOFF (lx): Use of Long-term Auctions for Network Investment
PRIV 30.2003 Emiel MAASLAND and Sander ONDERSTAL (lx): Auctions with Financial Externalities
ETA 31.2003 Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive
Externality NTU-Coalition Games
KNOW 32.2003 Michele MORETTO: Competition and Irreversible Investments under Uncertainty_
PRIV 33.2003 Philippe QUIRION: Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture?
KNOW 34.2003 Giuseppe MEDA, Claudio PIGA and Donald SIEGEL: On the Relationship between R&D and Productivity: A
Treatment Effect Analysis
ETA 35.2003 Alessandra DEL BOCA, Marzio GALEOTTI and Paola ROTA: Non-convexities in the Adjustment of Different
Capital Inputs: A Firm-level InvestigationGG 36.2003 Matthieu GLACHANT: Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
PRIV 37.2003 Narjess BOUBAKRI, Jean-Claude COSSET and Omrane GUEDHAMI: Postprivatization Corporate
Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection
CLIM 38.2003 Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL: Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers
KNOW 39.2003 Slim BEN YOUSSEF: Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade
CTN 40.2003 Carlo CARRARO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations
KNOW 41.2003 Sonia OREFFICE: Abortion and Female Power in the Household: Evidence from Labor Supply
KNOW 42.2003 Timo GOESCHL and Timothy SWANSON: On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing
Biotechnologies
ETA 43.2003 Giorgio BUSETTI and Matteo MANERA: STAR-GARCH Models for Stock Market Interactions in the Pacific
Basin Region, Japan and US
CLIM 44.2003 Katrin MILLOCK and Céline NAUGES: The French Tax on Air Pollution: Some Preliminary Results on its
Effectiveness
PRIV 45.2003 Bernardo BORTOLOTTI and Paolo PINOTTI: The Political Economy of Privatization
SIEV 46.2003 Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Burn or Bury? A Social Cost Comparison of Final Waste
Disposal Methods
ETA 47.2003 Jens HORBACH: Employment and Innovations in the Environmental Sector: Determinants and Econometrical
Results for Germany
CLIM 48.2003 Lori SNYDER, Nolan MILLER and Robert STAVINS: The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology
Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing
CLIM 49.2003 Lori SNYDER, Robert STAVINS and Alexander F. WAGNER: Private Options to Use Public Goods. Exploiting
Revealed Preferences to Estimate Environmental Benefits
CTN 50.2003 László Á. KÓCZY and Luc LAUWERS (lxi): The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
CTN 51.2003 Matthew O. JACKSON (lxi):Allocation Rules for Network Games
CTN 52.2003 Ana MAULEON and Vincent VANNETELBOSCH (lxi): Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation
CTN 53.2003 Fernando VEGA-REDONDO (lxi): Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: a network approach
CTN 54.2003 Matthew HAAG and Roger LAGUNOFF (lxi): On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation
CTN 55.2003 Taiji FURUSAWA and Hideo KONISHI (lxi): Free Trade Networks
CTN 56.2003 Halis Murat YILDIZ (lxi): National Versus International Mergers and Trade Liberalization
CTN 57.2003 Santiago RUBIO and Alistair ULPH (lxi): An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International
Environmental Agreements
KNOW 58.2003 Carole MAIGNAN, Dino PINELLI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: ICT, Clusters and Regional Cohesion: A
Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Research
KNOW 59.2003 Giorgio BELLETTINI and Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO: Special Interests and Technological Change
ETA 60.2003 Ronnie SCHÖB: The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey
CLIM 61.2003 Michael FINUS, Ekko van IERLAND and Robert DELLINK: Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel
Formation Game
GG 62.2003 Michael FINUS and Bianca RUNDSHAGEN: How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of
International Environmental Agreements
SIEV 63.2003 Alberto PETRUCCI: Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy
CLIM 64.2003 Joseph E. ALDY, Scott BARRETT and Robert N. STAVINS: Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate
Policy Architectures
SIEV 65.2003 Edi DEFRANCESCO: The Beginning of Organic Fish Farming in Italy
SIEV 66.2003 Klaus CONRAD: Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers Care for the Environment
SIEV 67.2003 Paulo A.L.D. NUNES, Luca ROSSETTO, Arianne DE BLAEIJ: Monetary Value Assessment of Clam Fishing
Management Practices in the Venice Lagoon: Results from a Stated Choice Exercise
CLIM 68.2003 ZhongXiang ZHANG: Open Trade with the U.S. Without Compromising Canada’s Ability to Comply with its
Kyoto Target
KNOW 69.2003 David FRANTZ (lix): Lorenzo Market between Diversity and Mutation
KNOW 70.2003 Ercole SORI (lix): Mapping Diversity in Social History
KNOW 71.2003 Ljiljana DERU SIMIC (lxii): What is Specific about Art/Cultural Projects?
KNOW 72.2003 Natalya V. TARANOVA (lxii):The Role of the City in Fostering Intergroup Communication in a Multicultural
Environment: Saint-Petersburg’s Case
KNOW 73.2003 Kristine CRANE (lxii): The City as an Arena for the Expression of Multiple Identities in the Age of
Globalisation and Migration
KNOW 74.2003 Kazuma MATOBA (lxii): Glocal Dialogue- Transformation through Transcultural Communication
KNOW 75.2003 Catarina REIS OLIVEIRA (lxii): Immigrants’ Entrepreneurial Opportunities: The Case of the Chinese in
Portugal
KNOW 76.2003 Sandra WALLMAN (lxii): The Diversity of Diversity - towards a typology of urban systems
KNOW 77.2003 Richard PEARCE (lxii): A Biologist’s View of Individual Cultural Identity for the Study of Cities
KNOW 78.2003 Vincent MERK (lxii): Communication Across Cultures: from Cultural Awareness to Reconciliation of the
Dilemmas
KNOW 79.2003 Giorgio BELLETTINI, Carlotta BERTI CERONI and Gianmarco I.P.OTTAVIANO: Child Labor and Resistance
to Change
ETA 80.2003 Michele MORETTO, Paolo M. PANTEGHINI and Carlo SCARPA: Investment Size and Firm’s Value under
Profit Sharing RegulationIEM 81.2003 Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Oil and Product Dynamics in International
Petroleum Markets
CLIM 82.2003 Y. Hossein FARZIN and Jinhua ZHAO: Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against
Environmental Regulation
CLIM 83.2003 Giuseppe DI VITA: Is the Discount Rate Relevant in Explaining the Environmental Kuznets Curve?
CLIM 84.2003 Reyer GERLAGH and Wietze LISE: Induced Technological Change Under Carbon Taxes
NRM 85.2003 Rinaldo BRAU, Alessandro LANZA and Francesco PIGLIARU: How Fast are the Tourism Countries Growing?
The cross-country evidence
KNOW 86.2003 Elena BELLINI, Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Dino PINELLI: The ICT Revolution: opportunities and risks
for the Mezzogiorno
SIEV 87.2003 Lucas BRETSCGHER and Sjak SMULDERS: Sustainability and Substitution of Exhaustible Natural Resources.
How resource prices affect long-term R&D investments
CLIM 88.2003 Johan EYCKMANS and Michael FINUS: New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of
Global Warming
CLIM 89.2003 Marzio GALEOTTI: Economic Development and Environmental Protection
CLIM 90.2003 Marzio GALEOTTI: Environment and Economic Growth: Is Technical Change the Key to Decoupling?
CLIM 91.2003 Marzio GALEOTTI and Barbara BUCHNER: Climate Policy and Economic Growth in Developing Countries
IEM 92.2003 A. MARKANDYA, A. GOLUB and E. STRUKOVA: The Influence of Climate Change Considerations on Energy
Policy: The Case of Russia
ETA 93.2003 Andrea BELTRATTI: Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium
CTN 94.2003 Parkash CHANDER: The γ-Core and Coalition Formation
IEM 95.2003 Matteo MANERA and Angelo MARZULLO: Modelling the Load Curve of Aggregate Electricity Consumption
Using Principal Components
IEM 96.2003 Alessandro LANZA, Matteo MANERA, Margherita GRASSO and Massimo GIOVANNINI: Long-run Models of
Oil Stock Prices
CTN 97.2003 Steven J. BRAMS, Michael A.  JONES, and D. Marc KILGOUR: Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process
Matters
KNOW 98.2003 John CROWLEY, Marie-Cecile NAVES (lxiii): Anti-Racist Policies in France. From Ideological and Historical
Schemes to Socio-Political Realities
KNOW 99.2003 Richard THOMPSON FORD (lxiii): Cultural Rights and Civic Virtue
KNOW 100.2003 Alaknanda PATEL (lxiii): Cultural Diversity and Conflict in Multicultural Cities
KNOW 101.2003 David MAY (lxiii): The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood
KNOW 102.2003 Sébastien ARCAND, Danielle JUTEAU, Sirma BILGE, and Francine LEMIRE (lxiii) : Municipal Reform on the
Island of Montreal: Tensions Between Two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City
CLIM 103.2003 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime
CLIM 104.2003 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in
International Climate Agreements
CLIM 105.2003 Anil MARKANDYA and Dirk T.G. RÜBBELKE: Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
NRM 106.2003 Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Management Challenges for Multiple-Species Boreal Forests
NRM 107.2003 Anne Sophie CRÉPIN (lxiv): Threshold Effects in Coral Reef  Fisheries
SIEV 108.2003 Sara ANIYAR ( lxiv): Estimating the Value of Oil Capital in a Small Open Economy: The Venezuela’s Example
SIEV 109.2003 Kenneth ARROW, Partha DASGUPTA and Karl-Göran MÄLER(lxiv): Evaluating Projects and Assessing
Sustainable Development in Imperfect Economies
NRM 110.2003 Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Catarina ROSETA-PALMA(lxiv): Instabilities and Robust Control in  Fisheries
NRM 111.2003 Charles PERRINGS and Brian WALKER (lxiv): Conservation and Optimal Use of Rangelands
ETA 112.2003 Jack GOODY (lxiv): Globalisation, Population and Ecology
CTN 113.2003 Carlo CARRARO, Carmen MARCHIORI and Sonia OREFFICE: Endogenous Minimum Participation in
International Environmental Treaties
CTN 114.2003 Guillaume HAERINGER and Myrna WOODERS: Decentralized Job Matching
CTN 115.2003 Hideo KONISHI and M. Utku UNVER: Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
CTN 116.2003 Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for the Room-Mates Problem
CTN 117.2003 Somdeb LAHIRI: Stable Matchings for a Generalized Marriage Problem
CTN 118.2003 Marita LAUKKANEN: Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty
CTN 119.2003 Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary
Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results
CTN 120.2003 Gianluigi VERNASCA: Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation
CTN 121.2003 Myrna WOODERS, Edward CARTWRIGHT and Reinhard SELTEN: Social Conformity in Games with Many
Players
CTN 122.2003 Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players
CTN 123.2003 Edward CARTWRIGHT and Myrna WOODERS: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many
Players
1000 Carlo CARRARO, Alessandro LANZA and Valeria PAPPONETTI: One Thousand Working PapersNOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2004
IEM 1.2004 Anil MARKANDYA, Suzette PEDROSO and Alexander GOLUB:  Empirical Analysis of National Income and
So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries
ETA 2.2004 Masahisa FUJITA and Shlomo WEBER: Strategic Immigration Policies and Welfare in Heterogeneous Countries
PRA 3.2004 Adolfo DI CARLUCCIO, Giovanni FERRI, Cecilia FRALE and Ottavio RICCHI: Do Privatizations Boost
Household Shareholding? Evidence from Italy
ETA 4.2004 Victor GINSBURGH and Shlomo WEBER: Languages Disenfranchisement in the European Union
ETA 5.2004 Romano PIRAS: Growth, Congestion of Public Goods, and Second-Best Optimal Policy
CCMP 6.2004 Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: Lessons from the Polder: Is Dutch CO2-Taxation Optimal
PRA 7.2004 Sandro BRUSCO, Giuseppe LOPOMO and S. VISWANATHAN (lxv): Merger Mechanisms
PRA 8.2004 Wolfgang AUSSENEGG, Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): IPO Pricing with Bookbuilding, and a
When-Issued Market
PRA 9.2004 Pegaret PICHLER and Alex STOMPER (lxv): Primary Market Design: Direct Mechanisms and Markets
PRA 10.2004 Florian ENGLMAIER, Pablo GUILLEN, Loreto LLORENTE, Sander ONDERSTAL and Rupert SAUSGRUBER
(lxv): The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions
PRA 11.2004 Bjarne BRENDSTRUP and Harry J. PAARSCH (lxv): Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Multi-
Unit, Sequential, Oral, Ascending-Price Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders
PRA 12.2004 Ohad KADAN (lxv): Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliated Private Values
PRA 13.2004 Maarten C.W. JANSSEN (lxv): Auctions as Coordination Devices
PRA 14.2004 Gadi FIBICH, Arieh GAVIOUS and Aner SELA (lxv): All-Pay Auctions with Weakly Risk-Averse Buyers
PRA 15.2004 Orly SADE, Charles SCHNITZLEIN and Jaime F. ZENDER (lxv): Competition and Cooperation in Divisible
Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination
PRA 16.2004 Marta STRYSZOWSKA (lxv): Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions
CCMP 17.2004 Slim Ben YOUSSEF: R&D in Cleaner Technology and International Trade
NRM 18.2004 Angelo ANTOCI, Simone BORGHESI and Paolo RUSSU (lxvi): Biodiversity and Economic Growth:
Stabilization Versus Preservation of the Ecological Dynamics
SIEV 19.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Paolo ROSATO, Alberto LONGO  and Valentina ZANATTA: Information and Willingness to
Pay in a Contingent Valuation Study: The Value of S. Erasmo in the Lagoon of Venice
NRM 20.2004 Guido CANDELA and Roberto CELLINI (lxvii): Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of
Differentiated Oligopoly
NRM 21.2004 Jacqueline M. HAMILTON (lxvii): Climate and the Destination Choice of German Tourists
NRM 22.2004 Javier Rey-MAQUIEIRA PALMER, Javier LOZANO IBÁÑEZ  and Carlos Mario GÓMEZ GÓMEZ (lxvii):
Land, Environmental Externalities and Tourism Development
NRM 23.2004 Pius ODUNGA and Henk FOLMER (lxvii): Profiling Tourists for Balanced Utilization of Tourism-Based
Resources in Kenya
NRM 24.2004 Jean-Jacques NOWAK, Mondher SAHLI and Pasquale M. SGRO (lxvii):Tourism, Trade and Domestic Welfare
NRM 25.2004 Riaz SHAREEF (lxvii): Country Risk Ratings of Small Island Tourism Economies
NRM 26.2004 Juan Luis EUGENIO-MARTÍN, Noelia MARTÍN MORALES and Riccardo SCARPA (lxvii): Tourism and
Economic Growth in Latin American Countries: A Panel Data Approach
NRM 27.2004 Raúl Hernández MARTÍN (lxvii): Impact of Tourism Consumption on GDP. The Role of Imports
CSRM 28.2004 Nicoletta FERRO: Cross-Country Ethical Dilemmas in Business: A Descriptive Framework
NRM 29.2004 Marian WEBER (lxvi): Assessing the Effectiveness of Tradable Landuse Rights for Biodiversity Conservation:
an Application to Canada's Boreal Mixedwood Forest
NRM 30.2004 Trond BJORNDAL, Phoebe KOUNDOURI and Sean PASCOE (lxvi): Output Substitution in Multi-Species
Trawl Fisheries: Implications for Quota Setting
CCMP 31.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA, Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part I: Sectoral Analysis of Climate Impacts in Italy
CCMP 32.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI, Alessandra GORIA ,Paolo MOMBRINI and Evi SPANTIDAKI: Weather Impacts on
Natural, Social and Economic Systems (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy
CTN 33.2004 Wilson PEREZ: Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
KTHC 34.2004 Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI (lxviii): The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence
from US Cities
KTHC 35.2004 Linda CHAIB (lxviii): Immigration and Local Urban Participatory Democracy: A Boston-Paris Comparison
KTHC 36.2004 Franca ECKERT COEN and Claudio ROSSI  (lxviii): Foreigners, Immigrants, Host Cities: The Policies of
Multi-Ethnicity in Rome. Reading Governance in a Local Context
KTHC 37.2004 Kristine CRANE (lxviii): Governing Migration: Immigrant Groups’ Strategies in Three Italian Cities – Rome,
Naples and Bari
KTHC 38.2004 Kiflemariam HAMDE (lxviii): Mind in Africa, Body in Europe: The Struggle for Maintaining and Transforming
Cultural Identity - A Note from the Experience of Eritrean Immigrants in Stockholm
ETA 39.2004 Alberto CAVALIERE: Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
PRA 40.2004 Andrea BIGANO and Stef PROOST: The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy:
Does the Degree of Competition Matter?
CCMP 41.2004 Micheal FINUS (lxix): International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution ProblemsKTHC 42.2004 Francesco CRESPI: Notes on the Determinants of Innovation: A Multi-Perspective Analysis
CTN 43.2004 Sergio CURRARINI and Marco MARINI: Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
CTN 44.2004 Marc ESCRIHUELA-VILLAR: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability
NRM 45.2004 Sebastian BERVOETS and Nicolas GRAVEL (lxvi): Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity:
An Axiomatic Approach
NRM 46.2004 Signe ANTHON and Bo JELLESMARK THORSEN (lxvi):  Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric
Information on Private Environmental Benefits
NRM 47.2004 John MBURU (lxvi): Wildlife Conservation and Management in Kenya: Towards a Co-management Approach
NRM 48.2004 Ekin BIROL, Ágnes GYOVAI  and Melinda SMALE (lxvi): Using a Choice Experiment to Value Agricultural
Biodiversity on Hungarian Small Farms: Agri-Environmental Policies in a Transition al Economy
CCMP 49.2004 Gernot KLEPPER and Sonja PETERSON: The EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Allowance Prices, Trade Flows,
Competitiveness Effects
GG 50.2004 Scott BARRETT and Michael HOEL: Optimal Disease Eradication
CTN 51.2004 Dinko DIMITROV, Peter BORM, Ruud HENDRICKX and Shao CHIN SUNG: Simple Priorities and Core
Stability in Hedonic Games
SIEV 52.2004 Francesco RICCI: Channels of Transmission of Environmental Policy to Economic Growth: A Survey of the
Theory
SIEV 53.2004 Anna ALBERINI, Maureen CROPPER, Alan KRUPNICK and Nathalie B. SIMON: Willingness to Pay for
Mortality Risk Reductions: Does Latency Matter?
NRM 54.2004 Ingo BRÄUER and Rainer MARGGRAF (lxvi): Valuation of Ecosystem Services Provided by Biodiversity
Conservation: An Integrated Hydrological and Economic Model to Value the Enhanced Nitrogen Retention in
Renaturated Streams
NRM 55.2004 Timo GOESCHL and  Tun LIN (lxvi): Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and
Regulatory Choices
NRM 56.2004 Tom DEDEURWAERDERE (lxvi): Bioprospection: From the Economics of Contracts to Reflexive Governance
CCMP 57.2004 Katrin REHDANZ  and David MADDISON: The Amenity Value of Climate to German Households
CCMP 58.2004 Koen SMEKENS and Bob VAN DER ZWAAN: Environmental Externalities of Geological Carbon Sequestration
Effects on Energy Scenarios
NRM 59.2004 Valentina BOSETTI, Mariaester CASSINELLI and Alessandro LANZA (lxvii): Using Data Envelopment
Analysis to Evaluate Environmentally Conscious Tourism Management
NRM 60.2004 Timo GOESCHL and Danilo CAMARGO IGLIORI (lxvi):Property Rights Conservation and Development: An
Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon
CCMP 61.2004 Barbara BUCHNER and Carlo CARRARO: Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a
Technology-based Climate Protocol
NRM 62.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S.
NRM 63.2004 Györgyi BELA, György PATAKI, Melinda SMALE and Mariann HAJDÚ (lxvi): Conserving Crop Genetic
Resources on Smallholder Farms in Hungary: Institutional Analysis
NRM 64.2004 E.C.M. RUIJGROK and E.E.M. NILLESEN (lxvi): The Socio-Economic Value of Natural Riverbanks in the
Netherlands
NRM 65.2004 E.C.M. RUIJGROK (lxvi): Reducing Acidification: The Benefits of Increased Nature Quality. Investigating the
Possibilities of the Contingent Valuation Method
ETA 66.2004 Giannis VARDAS and Anastasios XEPAPADEAS: Uncertainty Aversion, Robust Control and Asset Holdings
GG 67.2004 Anastasios XEPAPADEAS and Constadina PASSA: Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary
Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach
GG 68.2004 Michael FINUS: Modesty Pays: Sometimes!
NRM 69.2004 Trond BJØRNDAL and Ana BRASÃO: The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy
Implications
CTN 70.2004 Alejandro CAPARRÓS, Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI and Tarik TAZDAÏT: On Coalition Formation with
Heterogeneous Agents
IEM 71.2004 Massimo GIOVANNINI, Margherita GRASSO, Alessandro LANZA and Matteo MANERA: Conditional
Correlations in the Returns on Oil Companies Stock Prices and Their Determinants
IEM 72.2004 Alessandro LANZA,  Matteo MANERA and Michael MCALEER: Modelling Dynamic Conditional Correlations
in WTI Oil Forward and Futures Returns
SIEV 73.2004 Margarita GENIUS and Elisabetta STRAZZERA: The Copula Approach to Sample Selection Modelling:
An Application to the Recreational Value of Forests
CCMP 74.2004 Rob DELLINK and Ekko van IERLAND: Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General
Equilibrium Assessment
ETA 75.2004 Rosella LEVAGGI and Michele MORETTO: Investment in Hospital Care Technology under Different
Purchasing Rules: A Real Option Approach
CTN 76.2004 Salvador BARBERÀ and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in
a Heterogeneous Union
CTN 77.2004 Àlex ARENAS, Antonio CABRALES, Albert DÍAZ-GUILERA, Roger GUIMERÀ and Fernando VEGA-
REDONDO (lxx): Optimal Information Transmission in Organizations: Search and Congestion
CTN 78.2004 Francis BLOCH and Armando GOMES (lxx): Contracting with Externalities and Outside OptionsCTN 79.2004 Rabah AMIR, Effrosyni DIAMANTOUDI and Licun XUE (lxx): Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency
Gains
CTN 80.2004 Francis BLOCH and Matthew O. JACKSON (lxx): The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players
CTN 81.2004 Daniel DIERMEIER, Hülya ERASLAN and Antonio MERLO (lxx): Bicameralism and Government Formation
CTN 82.2004 Rod GARRATT, James E. PARCO, Cheng-ZHONG QIN and Amnon RAPOPORT (lxx): Potential Maximization
and Coalition Government Formation
CTN 83.2004 Kfir ELIAZ, Debraj RAY and Ronny RAZIN (lxx): Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement
CTN 84.2004 Sanjeev GOYAL, Marco van der LEIJ and José Luis MORAGA-GONZÁLEZ (lxx): Economics: An Emerging
Small World?
CTN 85.2004 Edward CARTWRIGHT (lxx): Learning to Play Approximate Nash Equilibria in Games with Many Players
IEM 86.2004 Finn R. FØRSUND and Michael HOEL: Properties of a Non-Competitive Electricity Market Dominated by
Hydroelectric Power
KTHC 87.2004 Elissaios PAPYRAKIS and Reyer GERLAGH: Natural Resources, Investment and Long-Term Income
CCMP 88.2004 Marzio GALEOTTI and Claudia KEMFERT: Interactions between Climate and Trade Policies: A Survey
IEM 89.2004 A. MARKANDYA, S. PEDROSO  and D. STREIMIKIENE: Energy Efficiency in Transition Economies: Is There
Convergence Towards the EU Average?
GG 90.2004 Rolf GOLOMBEK and Michael HOEL : Climate Agreements and Technology Policy
PRA 91.2004 Sergei IZMALKOV (lxv): Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction
KTHC 92.2004 Gianmarco I.P. OTTAVIANO and Giovanni PERI: Cities and Cultures
KTHC 93.2004 Massimo DEL GATTO:  Agglomeration, Integration, and Territorial Authority Scale in a System of Trading
Cities. Centralisation versus devolution
CCMP 94.2004 Pierre-André JOUVET, Philippe MICHEL and Gilles ROTILLON: Equilibrium with a Market of Permits
CCMP 95.2004 Bob van der ZWAAN  and Reyer GERLAGH: Climate Uncertainty and the Necessity to Transform Global Energy
Supply
CCMP 96.2004 Francesco BOSELLO, Marco LAZZARIN, Roberto ROSON and Richard S.J. TOL: Economy-Wide Estimates of
the Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise
CTN 97.2004 Gustavo BERGANTIÑOS and  Juan J. VIDAL-PUGA: Defining Rules in Cost Spanning Tree Problems Through
the Canonical Form
CTN 98.2004 Siddhartha BANDYOPADHYAY and Mandar OAK: Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of
Proportional Representation
GG 99.2004 Hans-Peter WEIKARD, Michael FINUS and Juan-Carlos ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA: The Impact of Surplus
Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements
SIEV 100.2004 Chiara M. TRAVISI and Peter NIJKAMP: Willingness to Pay for Agricultural Environmental Safety: Evidence
from a Survey of Milan, Italy, Residents
SIEV 101.2004 Chiara M. TRAVISI, Raymond J. G. M. FLORAX and Peter NIJKAMP:
 A Meta-Analysis of the Willingness to
Pay for Reductions in Pesticide Risk Exposure
NRM 102.2004 Valentina BOSETTI and David TOMBERLIN: Real Options Analysis of Fishing Fleet Dynamics: A Test
CCMP 103.2004 Alessandra GORIA e Gretel GAMBARELLI: Economic Evaluation of Climate Change Impacts and Adaptability
in Italy
PRA 104.2004 Massimo FLORIO and Mara GRASSENI: The Missing Shock: The Macroeconomic Impact of British
Privatisation(lix) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Mapping Diversity”, Leuven, May 16-
17, 2002
(lx) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications”, organised by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan, September 26-
28, 2002
(lxi) This paper was presented at the Eighth Meeting of the Coalition Theory Network organised by
the GREQAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, January 24-25, 2003
(lxii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Communication across Cultures in
Multicultural Cities”, The Hague, November 7-8, 2002
(lxiii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Social dynamics and conflicts in
multicultural cities”, Milan, March 20-21, 2003
(lxiv) This paper was presented at the International Conference on “Theoretical Topics in Ecological
Economics”, organised by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics - ICTP, the
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei – FEEM
Trieste, February 10-21, 2003
(lxv) This paper was presented at the EuroConference on “Auctions and Market Design: Theory,
Evidence and Applications” organised by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and sponsored by the EU,
Milan, September 25-27, 2003
(lxvi) This paper has been presented at the 4th BioEcon Workshop on “Economic Analysis of
Policies for Biodiversity Conservation” organised on behalf of the BIOECON Network by
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Venice International University (VIU) and University College
London (UCL) , Venice, August 28-29, 2003
(lxvii) This paper has been presented at the international conference on “Tourism and Sustainable
Economic Development – Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS
(Università di Cagliari e Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, and supported by the
World Bank, Sardinia, September 19-20, 2003
(lxviii) This paper was presented at the ENGIME Workshop on “Governance and Policies in
Multicultural Cities”, Rome, June 5-6, 2003
(lxix) This paper was presented at  the Fourth EEP Plenary Workshop and EEP Conference “The
Future of Climate Policy”, Cagliari, Italy, 27-28 March 2003
(lxx) This paper was presented at the 9
th Coalition Theory Workshop on "Collective Decisions and
Institutional Design" organised by the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and held in Barcelona,
Spain, January 30-31, 20042003 SERIES
  CLIM Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )
  GG Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  SIEV Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)
  NRM Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
  KNOW Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)
  IEM International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya)
  CSRM Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti)
  PRIV Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
  ETA Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  CTN Coalition Theory Network
2004 SERIES
  CCMP Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti )
  GG Global Governance (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  SIEV Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anna Alberini)
  NRM Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi)
  KTHC Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano)
  IEM International Energy Markets (Editor: Anil Markandya)
  CSRM Corporate Social Responsibility and Management (Editor: Sabina Ratti)
  PRA Privatisation, Regulation, Antitrust (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti)
  ETA Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro)
  CTN Coalition Theory Network